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Abstract
Although interests inhabit a central place in the multiple streams 
framework (MSF), interest groups have played only a minor role in 
theoretical and empirical studies until now. In Kingdon’s original 
conception, organized interests are a key variable in the politics 
stream. Revisiting Kingdon’s concept with a particular focus on 
interest groups and their activities—in different streams and at 
various levels—in the policy process, we take this argument further. 
In particular, we argue that specifying groups’ roles in other streams 
adds value to the explanatory power of the framework. To do this, we 
look at how interest groups affect problems, policies, and politics. 
The influence of interest groups within the streams is explained by 
linking the MSF with literature on interest intermediation. We show 
that depending on the number of conditions and their activity level, 
interest groups can be involved in all three streams. We illustrate this 
in case studies reviewing labor market policies in Germany and 
chemicals regulation at the European level.
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Introduction
John W. Kingdon posited that the answer to the questions of why some 
subjects rise on agendas and others do not and why some alternatives 
receive more attention than others lies in the processes through which 
different actors affect agendas and alternatives. By introducing three 
streams of processes—problems, policies, and politics—he indicated, 
respectively, that actors recognize problems, generate proposals for 
public policy changes, and engage in political activities such as election 
campaigns and pressure group lobbying (Kingdon 2003 ). While 
organized interests were a crucial variable in the original outline of the 
multiple streams framework (MSF, Kingdon 2003 ), its importance has 
diminished as a result of the refinements and amendments the 
framework has gone through since 1984.
Nowadays, interest groups play only a minor role in both theoretical 
and empirical studies conducted using the MSF. If they are included in 
analyses, they either are usually a variable in the politics stream 
(Bundgaard and Vrangbæk 2007 ; Nagel 2009 ) or are said to assume 
the role of policy entrepreneurs (Bendel 2006 ; Zahariadis 2008 ; Rüb 
2009 ). However, we argue that limiting the role of interest groups to 
the politics stream may result in incomplete analyses of policy 
processes, since they can also be crucial actors in the problem and 
policy streams.
The aim of this article is to show how the inclusion of interest groups in 
the MSF can improve the framework’s explanatory power. We start 
with the premise taken from Kingdon: The activities of actors involved 
in policy processes can be positive, like promoting new courses of 
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government action, or negative, like seeking to block changes in public 
policy (Kingdon 2003 , pp. 48–49). The literature on interest 
intermediation informs us that interest groups can engage in either of 
these activities (Baumgartner and Jones 1991 ). Implemented programs 
tend to be protected by lobbies built around them. The goal and ability 
of vetoing change distinguish interest groups from policy entrepreneurs, 
who are willing to invest their resources in return for high agenda status 
or enactment of policies they favor (Kingdon 2003 ). Interest groups are 
also distinct from the recently introduced concept of problem brokers 
who stress the necessity of changing the status quo (Knaggård 2015 ). In 
contrast, interest groups do not only pursue their own goals, but also 
aim to avoid undesired legislation.
The following sections explore venues for interest groups’ inclusion in 
the problem, policy and politics streams. In each stream, the role of 
interest groups is revisited and remarks are made based on the insights 
from the literature on interest intermediation. We explain the role and 
impact of interest groups in the streams by means of their resources, 
their skills and strategies, and their embeddedness in the institutional 
structures. In addition, we explore whether the same factors affect 
groups’ role at the domestic and supranational levels. We thus rehearse 
a classic theme in the interest group literature, namely whether different 
arenas provide diverse possibilities for interests (Schattschneider 1975 ; 
Truman 1951 ). To illustrate our arguments, we provide examples in 
two case studies, one on labor market policy in Germany and the other 
on chemicals regulation in the European Union (EU). We conclude with 
a speculation on future directions in the study of the MSF and interest 
groups.
Interest groups in problem, policy, and politics 
streams
Problem stream
The process of problem recognition and definition, of fixing attention 
on one problem rather than another, is a central part of agenda setting 
(Kingdon 2003 , p. 115). The dynamic of the problem stream is affected 
by indicators, feedback provided by running programs, focusing events, 
and the capacity of institutions to deal with potential problems (for 
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details, see: Zahariadis 2014 ). However, the problem stream lacks 
agency (Knaggård 2015 ), and focusing on interest groups’ activities 
can help contribute to the understanding of how problems are 
recognized and defined. Boscarino ( 2009 ), for example, provided 
empirical evidence that interest groups search the problem stream for 
issues to attach to their pet policies. Nedlund and Garpenby ( 2014 ) 
illustrate how problem frame differences shape the puzzling of a policy 
problem. And interest group literature tells us that groups are capable of 
controlling the image of a problem through the use of rhetoric and 
policy analysis (Baumgartner and Jones 1991 , p. 1045). Problems 
contain a perceptual, interpretive element (Kingdon 2003 , p. 110), 
which enables interested actors to interpret and frame them in a specific 
way and thereby tell a story about how a problem should be understood. 
Because every description of a situation reflects only one of many 
points of view, there is nothing preventing interest groups from 
fashioning portrayals to promote their own favored policies (Stone 
2002 ). Consequently, one role for interest groups in the problem stream 
involves framing conditions that they perceive as problematic.
Interest group scholars established that policymakers are more receptive 
to feedback providing interest groups (Hall and Deardorff 2006 ; 
Kohler-Koch 1994 ). In the ambiguous environment of fragmented 
public policy, legislators seeking reelection hope to champion problems 
that are of interest to a larger public. Groups with the appropriate 
knowledge and expertise, including especially information about the 
interests of a broader constituency, are in the strongest position to 
influence decision-makers’ perception of the problems. By analyzing 
indicators and assuring broad public appeal, interest groups can boost 
an issue higher on policymakers’ agenda or oppose an item moving it 
down the list of priorities or even off the agenda.
At the national level, a key element in the delivery of groups’ analysis 
is their institutional embeddedness, defined as the access individual 
groups enjoy to public actors, and may include various types of 
institutionalized group participation in policymaking (Beyers 2002 , pp. 
591–592). Incorporation in public boards and committees is often a 
main indicator of groups’ inclusion (Öberg et al. 2011 ). Corporatist 
systems of interest mediation are frequently pointed to as the best 
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examples of systems with high levels of institutionalized, interest group 
integration into decision-making processes. However, pluralist systems 
exhibit similar structures of group participation (Rhodes and Marsh 
1992 ). Nonetheless, not all groups benefit equally from institutional 
embeddedness. Binderkrantz ( 2005 ) concludes that some groups are 
regular policymaking insiders, while other groups may be outsiders with 
little or no access to policymakers. Thus, groups embedded in national 
policy processes—e.g., via public committees or national advisory 
boards—have a greater impact on problem definition than those not 
included.
While the embeddedness in domestic institutional structures is an 
important factor in securing agenda influence at the national level, there 
is a broad consensus that the feedback that groups produce alone 
secures similar influence at the supranational level (Lowery et al. 2008 ; 
Quittkat and Kotzian 2011 ; Rietig 2014 ). When looking in particular at 
the European Union’s supranational structure, Bouwen ( 2002 , 2004 ) 
argues that the type of feedback that groups produce is the most 
important resource at their disposal to gain access to different 
policymakers. The policy officials in the European Commission (CEC) 
are most interested in expertise and technical know-how related to 
understanding the market and public demands; the members of 
European Parliament (EP) seek knowledge on aggregated needs and 
interests in the European economic arena; and the Council’s members 
look for information on the aggregated needs and interests of specific 
domestic sectors. As a consequence, it is more probable that business 
groups, which have more resources to generate expertise, will be a 
source of feedback for the Commission; European associations will 
have higher degree of access to the EP, and national associations will be 
more welcomed in the Council of Ministers.
Based on the inputs presented above, we hypothesize that the power of 
interest groups over problem definition is a sum of their framing skills 
and public appeal that they provide to the policymakers. Depending on 
the level at which the problem stream is analyzed, the examination of 
the embeddedness of groups in domestic institutional structures 
(national level) and the feedback which policymakers require and 
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groups can provide (European level) are additional factors which could 
further explain groups’ impact on the problem stream.
Policy stream
The policy stream comprises ideas that compete to win acceptance. The 
position of interest groups in the policy communities, where ideas are 
generated, is unclear. Kingdon ( 2003 , p. 117) lists “analysts for interest 
groups” and Rüb ( 2009 , p. 355) interest groups representatives as part 
of policy communities, while Zahariadis ( 2007 , p. 72) does not include 
them at all. Kingdon’s explanatory examples also point to different 
associations as being involved in advocating certain solutions (e.g., the 
American Medical Association’s involvement in the national health 
insurance reform in the 1970s; 2003, p. 123). The members of policy 
communities can come from both inside and outside governmental 
structures. But they have to be aware of each other, their ideas, and 
proposals, but often have personal interactions (Kingdon 2003 , p. 117). 
Thus, by interacting with other members of the community and making 
their positions salient, groups can increase their chance of becoming 
members themselves.
Kingdon ( 2003 , p. 118) stated that policy communities differ in 
different policy areas, ranging from closed, tight-knit communities to 
larger, more diverse, fragmented communities. The tight-knit 
communities resemble the advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems 
as defined in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF; Sabatier 1998 ). 
They are long-lasting, stable, and integrated coalitions which produce 
new solutions only when faced with a shock originating outside the 
subsystem (Sabatier 1998 , p. 105). This results either in one dominant 
coalition being replaced by another (Radaelli 1999 , p. 666) or in a 
context which encourages competing coalitions to find a compromise 
superior to the status quo by devising a positive-sum solution rather 
than engaging in a zero-sum fight (Sabatier 1998 ). Closed, tight-knit 
communities appear usually in corporatist systems of interest mediation 
where interest groups gain access to policymaking by ensuring the 
implementation of policies and thereby adding to overall steering 
capacity of the state (Jordan 1990 ; Schmitter 1989 ).
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The research on interest groups’ participation in policymaking tells us 
that groups’ involvement is becoming more temporal, ad hoc, and fluid 
(Christiansen et al. 2010 , p. 32). In the context of eroding corporatism, 
governments have opportunities to make selective use of some groups, 
based on their resources. This strategy of a controlled inclusion 
primarily strengthens the government itself. Since governmental politics 
is dominating, the patterns of interest mediation are subject to 
fluctuation. Furthermore, a change of government is likely to result in a 
changed pattern of interest mediation (Rehder 2009 , p. 270).
This results in various arrangements (e.g., commissions, committees, 
boards) producing different ideas. These subsequently enter the policy 
stream abruptly and compete with each other to garner the attention of 
politicians. Consequently, the communities become larger and more 
fragmented and are characterized by a more competitive mode of 
interaction. As such, interest groups are not systematically involved in 
policymaking, and their involvement is more sporadic.
The temporal, larger and less integrated communities are especially 
prominent at the supranational level. The EU’s communities consist of 
complex networks of insider and outsider actors (Marks 1993 ; Marks et 
al. 1996 ), which are not guided by clear institutional structures but, 
rather, show little or no formalization (Ainsworth 2001 ), are limited in 
their duration, and have a single issue profile. Actors have considerable 
autonomy and are open to changing their beliefs and their preferences 
as long as doing so helps them meet their ultimate goals. As such, good 
arguments can matter even more than bargaining power at the EU level 
(Pollack 2005 ). Information exchange seems to play an especially 
crucial role in creating and sustaining these communities.
When considering interest groups’ inclusion in the EU policy 
communities, some authors suggest that community formation is an 
effect of long-standing partnerships between actors working on similar 
issues (Mazey and Richardson 2007 ; Greenwood 1997 ; Rietig 2014 ). 
However, others provide evidence that EU interest groups form or 
participate in short-term, ad hoc coalitions which are more suitable to 
the supranational, dynamic EU environment and its issue arenas 
(Pijnenburg 1998 ; Warleigh 2000 ; Rozbicka 2013 ). Interest groups’ 
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influence and participation in the EU communities are related to the 
groups’ ability to efficiently transform and transmit information 
(Chalmers 2011 ; Bouwen and McCown 2007 ; Coen 1997 ). As EU-
level policymaking is separate from the national implementation efforts, 
interest group involvement in implementation efforts plays only a minor 
role for groups’ incorporation into the community (Knill and Liefferink 
2007 ; Falkner et al. 2005 ).
In sum, when it comes to interest groups’ participation in the policy 
stream, the focus should be more on temporal arrangements, where 
interest group involvement is more ad hoc, than on homogenous and 
closed communities. Established interest groups can no longer assume 
they will be included, which may also give rise to new opportunities for 
previously excluded groups and their ideas.
Politics stream
The politics stream has been subject to several re-conceptions, which 
has also affected the role of interest groups within it. In Kingdon’s 
framework, which was developed for the pluralist, US-presidential 
system, interest groups pressing their demands on government activities 
join the national mood and turnover in government as important 
variables for explaining agenda prominence. Adapting the original 
framework to countries with relatively centralized political systems and 
strong political parties, such as in European parliamentary systems, 
Zahariadis put organized interests with the national mood and 
legislative or administrative turnover into one variable—the “ideology 
of governing parties” (Zahariadis 1999 , p. 79). However, he underlined 
that politicians often view the support or opposition of interest groups 
as an indication of consensus or dissent in the broader political arena. In 
the case of conflicting views, politicians’ perception of the balance of 
support and opposition affects the issue’s prominence or obscurity on 
the agenda (Zahariadis 1999 , p. 75, 2007 , p. 73).
The interest intermediation literature specifies the conditions for 
groups’ influence. Korpi ( 1983 ) showed that in market-based 
economies, unions and employers inhibit fundamental power resources 
by representing the workforce and controlling production means, 
respectively. However, a large membership base and control over 
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crucial resources do not guarantee interest groups’ influence on 
government parties (Kingdon 2003 , p. 51). In particular, in times of 
loosening electoral ties, governments tend to balance organized 
interests with the national mood, which shifts from time to time 
(Trampusch 2003 ). In addition, the interplay between organizations and 
the government is strongly affected by campaigns and the electoral 
cycle (Rehder 2009 , p. 270).
While Zahariadis’ focus on of party politics makes sense in 
parliamentary democracies, it is not suitable for the analysis of 
supranational policymaking, where party politics plays only a minor 
role. In the EU, interest groups are not as dependent on party politics to 
influence the policy process as at the national level. The ability to lobby 
both national and EU-level politicians means the number of access 
points is larger (Greenwood 2007 ; Kresi et al. 2006 ; Cram 2001 ). In 
particular, at the EU level, the access of groups to different institutional 
actors, including the CEC, the EP, the Council of European Union, and 
their subunits, is less formalized. Furthermore, lobbying is the accepted 
and expected form of interest intermediation at the EU level (Daviter 
2011 ; Peters 2001 ). Authors agree that success at this level depends on 
skillful use of all available resources (Bouwen 2004 ; Chalmers 2011 ; 
Peters 2001 ). Because of the fluidity of the institutions and the absence 
of a central EU authority, groups are empowered to use their skills more 
effectively (Zahariadis 2008 , p. 527). In addition, building a network of 
supporters who have skills, interest, and capacities helps policy 
participants to achieve their goals (Weible et al. 2012 , p. 13).
AQ1
Based on these insights from the interest group literature, we claim that 
the explanatory potential of including interest groups into the MSF is 
contextually conditioned by the decision-making level under 
consideration. When studying the politics stream at the national level, 
scholars should concentrate on how interest groups employ their 
resources and how their interests are accepted by the national mood and 
the governing parties. In contrast, at the supranational level, where 
interests’ intermediation is not dependent on party politics, interest 
groups’ skillful use of available resources will be a more useful 
explanatory variable.
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Illustrative case studies
To illustrate our arguments, we offer examples from two policy areas 
where interest groups are important actors in policymaking. First, we 
examine an instance of policymaking in German labor market policies, 
where the peak associations of labor and industry play a strong role due 
to their importance in implementing policies. Employers and unions are 
of special significance for the dynamic of the three streams.
While labor market policy is still mainly decided at the domestic level, 
other policy areas in Europe are communitarized, which means that the 
main decision takes place at the European level. In those policy areas, 
lobbyism is therefore focused on the European level. As an illustrative 
case study at the supranational level, we bring up the harmonization of 
chemicals control in Europe, which is, to date, considered the most 
extensive exercise in interest group participation in European 
policymaking (Wonka 2008 ).
Probing at different levels and focusing on different topics add nuance 
to the argument and reduce external validity threats by enhancing 
generalization of results (Lucas 2003 ; Shadish et al. 2002 ). Moreover, 
the application across different levels helps us to compare the effect of 
different institutional configurations on interest groups’ inclusion in the 
framework. This approach in particular addresses the criticism that the 
MSF does not adequately display how institutional venues structure 
agenda setting and policymaking (Schlager 2007 ; Tiernan and Burke 
2002 ).
National level: German labor market policies
In the early 1990s, the lack of fundamental reform in social policy 
initiated a debate over German business competitiveness on the world 
market, with employers arguing that the highly regulated labor market 
and steep social insurance taxes dampened worker productivity (Cox 
2001 , p. 491). However, the inclusion of interest groups’ 
representatives in labor market policy formation prevented an agenda 
which included discussion of far-reaching reforms. The fact that such 
agenda setting did not take place until 2002 can be explained by 
including organized interest as a variable in all three streams.
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Problem stream: the role of social partners in problem definition
The strong role of the social partners in problem definition is starkly 
illustrated in the case of the 1998 “Bündnis für Arbeit” (Alliance for 
Work), a tripartite social-pact for enhancing employment and 
competitiveness. The red-green coalition led by Chancellor Schröder 
consulted the Confederation of German Trade Unions and the 
Confederation (DGB) of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) to 
initiate a policy’s reform in 1998. The pact created a “Workgroup on 
Benchmarking” composed of economists and social scientists to both 
define problems and identify proposals to enhance the employment rate.
As a first step, the workgroup compared the German conditions with 
conditions in other countries, laying the foundation for a reform by 
reaching a mutual interpretation of problems (Fels et al. 1999 ). Among 
other things, the group defined the high level of non-wage costs and the 
excluding effects of German wage policy for low-skilled jobs as 
problematic. However, this problem definition was rejected by the 
unions, which feared that this would encourage the widening of a low-
pay sector via non-tariff zones and a potential erosion of standard 
wages. The workgroup’s interpretation of indicators did not fit the 
perceptions and arguments of unions and employers, both of which 
demanded alternative formulations (Heinze 2006 , p. 94). Consequently, 
problem definition became difficult when unions and the employers’ 
associations joined in the discussion, seeking to include the 
workgroup’s analyses into their strategies. This example shows that 
groups embedded in national policymaking are in a strong position to 
interpret indicators and can move items off the agenda by framing 
conditions as not problematic.
Policy stream: erosion of corporatist community and emerging of 
new policies
The “Bündnis für Arbeit” illustrates how the inclusion of interest 
groups in policy communities affects the evolution of policies. The 
workgroup’s proposed concepts [reducing non-wage costs for low-
skilled jobs and widening the low-pay sector by implementing non-
tariff zones in combination with a negative tax, tightening eligibility 
criteria and lowering benefits for long-term unemployed (Fels et al. 
1999 )] failed to rise to the top of the corporatist policy community due 
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to resistance by trade unions, which were convinced that promoting a 
low-pay sector would erode standard wages (Patzwaldt 2007 : 218
–220). Ultimately, the social partners influenced the composition of the 
working group, including scholars who were closely connected to 
unions and employers. However, the group’s importance was 
marginalized in the following debates. In general, the proportional 
interest representation in the pact’s steering committee resulted in a 
permanent stalemate, as the social partners refused to make concessions 
(Schmid 2003 : 73). Since the mode of interaction was less 
argumentative than focused on conciliation through bargaining, the 
social partners could only reach settlements with the government when 
the negotiations had the character of a nonzero-sum game. Thus, 
corporatism enabled a non-parliamentary redistribution of costs and 
benefits financed by the government (Czada 2003 : 41, 53). However, 
the short-term, positive-sum game of such a classical tripartite 
coordination, which allowed a diffuse externalization of the costs of 
mutual compensation, was no longer a viable option in the context of 
the financial crisis of the welfare state and the European Common 
Market integration (Jochem 2009 ). As a result, the corporatist 
bargaining no longer led to agreements over controversial issues.
In January 2002, a political scandal, which uncovered manipulated 
statistics in the German Employment Agency, opened a window of 
opportunity to set the agenda for a fundamental reform by 
circumventing the traditional corporatist structures. The scandal 
highlighted the ineffectiveness of labor market policies and 
delegitimized not only the system itself, but also the social partners who 
were involved in implementing policies and administering the 
employment agency. Therefore, the scandal offered an opportunity to 
replace the corporatist policy community. Along these lines, the 
government appointed a commission named after its chairman, Peter 
Hartz, a well-known entrepreneur of new employment programs. The 
Hartz Committee was tasked with preparing a reform of labor market 
policies.
Although some members of the committee came from trade unions and 
employers’ associations, they were not officially included as 
representatives of these social partners. Instead, the government and 
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Peter Hartz chose members who took a sanguine view of free market-
forces, including company executives and business consultants. The 
composition of the committee enabled agreement on recommendations 
to fundamentally reform the German labor market system (Hartz et al. 
2002 ), which especially conflicted with unions’ interests (Spohr 2015 : 
180). Specifically, their radicalism lay in combining new eligibility 
rules with a retrenchment and unification of benefits for the long-term 
unemployed. Thus, the replacement of established interest groups by 
new actors in the context of eroding corporatism contributed to the 
emerging of new policies.
Politics stream: interest groups, political parties, and the national 
mood
Our assumption is that the dynamic of the politics stream can be best 
understood by focussing on how governing parties judge the acceptance 
of groups’ interests by the national mood. This can be illustrated by the 
relationship between the German unions and the social democratic 
party. Immediately after the social democratic government took over in 
1998, it took back changes of the previous conservative government in 
labor market policies and public unemployment insurance. The so-
called correction law was a rewarding of the unions for their support in 
the electoral campaign (Streeck 2003 , p. 7).
The social democrats revaluation of the importance of the different 
organized interests explains the transformation of the Hartz 
Committee’s recommendations into law. While industrial leaders and 
most parties supported its recommendations, there were strong protests 
by the trade unions against cuts in unemployment benefits and the new 
definition of eligibility. However, the national mood turned against the 
unions and strategies which worked to their disadvantage gained 
importance even in the social democratic party (Trampusch and 2003 , 
p. 17). This shift in national mood thus served as an incentive for the 
government to pursue legislation of the Hartz Committee 
recommendations, resulting in four controversial laws which came into 
effect in the years 2003 and 2004.
Supranational level: European chemicals regulation
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On the cusp of the twentieth century, the implementation deficit of 
chemicals regulation across the European Union gave rise to a 
discussion promoting the revision of the existing system of chemicals 
control. The core of the debate was how to create regulations which 
would be broad and effective, aiming to improve human health and the 
environment through better, earlier identification of the dangerous 
properties of chemical substances. A number of scholars who 
subsequently analyzed the process of chemicals regulation in Europe 
concluded that its development process consisted of a number of turning 
points that cannot be simply explained by analyzing policymakers’ 
actions and the existence of focusing events (examples: Kjær 2007 ; 
Margossian 2007 ; Wonka 2008 ). Adding interest groups to the 
classical MSF approach solves a puzzle of those turning points.
Problem stream: framing based on addressee’s needs
The main conflict over problem definition in the chemicals regulation 
debate arose between public interest groups and business 
representatives (Wonka 2008 ; Kjær 2007 ). Public interest groups, 
represented by umbrella environmental organizations (like European 
Environmental Bureau—EEB, Greenpeace, and Friends of Earth 
Europe—FoEE), focused on the registration process for dangerous 
chemicals. Their analysis clearly indicated that the process was 
ineffective and opaque (CEC 2001 ). In contrast, business associations 
(e.g., Verband der Chemischen Industrie—VCI) focused on the negative 
effects arising from the full transparency provisions of the registration 
process, which raise costs for companies and thus lead to job losses 
across Europe (Pesendorfer 2006 ).
The arguments used by business representatives resonated in particular 
with the CEC, responsible for the initial draft of the new regulation. 
Business arguments were framed in such a way as to match feedback 
sought by the Commission: good understanding of the market (i.e., 
costs of deployment of the new registration system) and public demands 
(i.e., job losses). Consequently, the prevailing problem definition 
presented in the Commission’s proposal of the new regulation highly 
resembled the one delivered by the business associations. The problem 
of revising the transparency requirements was considered, but the 
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Commission initially did not increase these obligations (CEC 2003 ). 
This example shows that groups can influence the problem definition of 
particular policymakers by employing appropriate framing.
Policy stream: low-integrated, supranational policy community
The EU chemicals regulation provides an example of a low-integrated 
community. European institutions consulted a number of different 
interest groups on various occasions, including holding seven technical 
working groups between 2001 and 2002, inter-stakeholders’ workshops 
in 2001, 2003, and 2004, as well as EP public hearings in 2005 (CEC 
2007 ). In particular, the working groups and inter-stakeholders’ 
workshops were temporary, with participants fluctuating depending on 
institutions’ needs for particular types of expertise. The result was a 
fluid policy community whose members were replaced ad hoc.
The ad hoc character of the community resulted in an ongoing 
redefinition of policy ideas. Initially, the European institutions 
cooperated mostly with the environmental “giants,” like EEB and 
World Wild Fund (WWF), but also more regional organizations, like 
the Danish Society for Conservation of Nature. This cooperation 
resulted in a policy proposal aimed at establishing an ambitious, unified 
chemicals agenda at the international level, which gained the support of 
Swedish, Dutch, and Austrian members of the Council (EC 2004 ). 
When it became clear that the revision of the chemicals regulation in 
Europe was unavoidable, more stakeholders were invited to the 
negotiation table and they brought their own policy ideas. The European 
chemicals industry and its associations (e.g., CEFIC, BASF) demanded 
the simplification of existing regulations in order to make them easier to 
observe and thus a much less ambitious policy solution (Pesendorfer 
2006 ; Schorling 2004 ). An intensive information exchange took place 
between business and the conservative members of the EP and the 
Enterprise Directorate General in the Commission. This cooperation 
was further supported by German and French trade unions and the 
British and French national experts located in the Council’s structures.
Inclusion of interest groups in the policy community affected the 
advancement of chemicals policy. From an ambitious project initially 
championed by environmental organizations, it was transformed into a 
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watered down solution with only minor changes to the earlier system of 
chemicals regulation. For instance, one of the stated goals of the 
regulation, protection of the environment, was removed from the text of 
the final policy documents entirely (CEC 2007 ).
Politics stream: skillful use of resources and window of 
opportunity
Above, we have argued that when studying the politics stream at the 
supranational level, scholars should take interest groups’ skillful 
deployment of their resources into account as an explanatory variable. 
One instance of environmental NGOs taking an anti-industry stance on 
the chemicals regulation illustrates this well. FoEE (one of the largest 
European environmental NGOs) started an initiative on October 17, 
2006, under the title “EU Commissioners in bed with business,” 
criticizing the close relations between the CEC and corporate lobbying 
in the chemicals regulation process as inappropriate (FoEE 
17/10/ 2006 ). Using their network of grassroots national organizations 
(the group resource in form of its membership base), FoEE was able to 
reprint the images from the initiative across national arenas. 
Consequently, national representatives in the Council requested the 
Commission to alter its behavior. Thus, the skillful use of the groups’ 
membership base allowed it to influence the public mood at the national 
level across countries and to impact the European, supranational level.
While NGOs managed to impact on the behavior of the main 
stakeholders, they still failed in exercising larger influence on the final 
result of the policymaking process. The actions undertaken by business 
representatives were much more successful. A number of business 
associations involved in the chemicals regulation (e.g., CEFIC, BASF, 
VCI) recognized the review of the Lisbon Strategy (2003)—a document 
which was developed in parallel to the chemicals regulation and looked 
to make the EU the most competitive economic space in the world—as 
a political window of opportunity. Accordingly, they framed further 
regulation as a stumbling block toward achieving the Lisbon Strategy’s 
goals (Schorling 2004 ). This proved to be an additional catalyst for the 
adoption of a less restrictive regulation. Ultimately, the document 
resulting from this process, the “REACH” Regulation (2006), 
introduced only few minor changes relative to the policy documents 
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from the 1990s (i.e., minor adjustments to the registration procedure). A 
skillful deployment of framing (e.g., linking groups’ arguments with the 
window of opportunity) resulted in an outcome which barely affected 
the chemicals industry in Europe.
Summed up
Our case studies illustrated the theoretical arguments derived from the 
MSF’s definitions and the interest intermediation literature from the 
previous section. We showed that interest groups can take active roles 
in the three streams. In the problem stream, the negative role of the 
German trade unions in the “Bündnis für Arbeit” provided an example 
showing that groups embedded in national policymaking are in a 
position to move items off the agenda by framing conditions as 
unproblematic. In contrast, the EU chemicals regulation illustrated how 
interest groups were successful in framing the problem to match their 
favored solution, which they placed simultaneously in the policy 
stream. Delivered feedback, based on the needs of the CEC, proved to 
be an important access good for these interest groups in the problem 
stream.
Germany’s labor market policy community was perennially 
homogenous and closed to the inclusion of new actors and ideas. 
Fundamentally new policies could only emerge due to the replacement 
of established interest groups by new actors in the context of eroding 
corporatism. In the low-integrated, supranational community, 
participation of groups was fluctuating and based on information and 
expertise that they could deliver. The intensified information exchange 
between business representatives and the key EU stakeholders in the 
later stages of the policy’s development resulted in a much less 
ambitious policy alternative than originally suggested.
In the politics stream at the national level, government balanced 
interests against the national mood. A shift in national mood against the 
unions served as an incentive for the government to pursue legislation. 
At the European level, NGOs’ use of their membership base influenced 
the behavior of the Commission and the Council. And yet, by 
combining the framing of their argument with the use of the political 
window of opportunity, business groups altered the policy development. 
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Both instances are examples of skillful actions of interest groups which 
resulted in measureable changes.
Where do we go from here?
In this article, we have explored how to include interest groups in the 
MSF analysis and the factors which could improve the explanatory 
power of such a combination. As we showed in our illustrative cases, 
the inclusion of interest groups in the MSF analysis can on the one hand 
explain the redefinition of both problems and solutions and show how 
they are coupled into a policy. Thus, interest groups are likely to take 
over the role of policy entrepreneurs, especially since agenda setting 
and policy changes require someone who takes advantage at the right 
time to match policies to problems. And the best way of developing a 
sense of timing is to participate for extended periods of time (Weible et 
al. 2012 : 15); something interest groups certainly are capable to do due 
to their good contacts, financial resources, and manpower. On the other 
hand, however—and in contrast to problem brokers and policy 
entrepreneurs—interests groups do not only pursue their own goals, but 
also aim to avoid the agenda setting of certain problems and policies 
and thereby hinder the coupling process. The insights from the interest 
intermediation literature informed us of the conditions which enhance 
interest groups’ role in the three streams and could be tested more 
extensively in future research.
First, we suggest that the power of interest groups over problem 
definition is a sum of their framing skills and the feedback that they 
provide. On the national level, the impact of groups on the problem 
stream can be explored through the prism of their embeddedness in the 
domestic institutional system. On the European level, their impact stems 
from the information about economic and public demands required by 
policymakers. An important role in the policy stream is granted to those 
interest groups at the national level that ensure a proper implementation 
of the policies. At the European level, delivering expertise and 
information exchange are crucial resources to gain importance in 
developing policies. While exploring policy communities, we 
established that when interest groups are involved, the researcher has to 
deal with more temporal arrangements rather than long-lasting policy 
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communities. Doing so will result in a better explanation of the 
increased contingency in the policy stream. In the politics stream, we 
concluded that interest groups’ success at the national level is 
dependent on party politics and a match of groups’ interests with the 
national mood. At the European level, party politics and national mood 
play only a minor role. The analysis of groups’ resources and their 
deployment will be more informative.
Including interest groups in the MSF holds considerable potential. Since 
the empirical evidence offered here remains only illustrative, however, 
further rigorous tests are needed to probe the validity of our arguments. 
In particular, comparative studies involving different policy areas with 
different issue characteristics are necessary. After all, the arguments 
presented here on labor market and chemicals regulation may be invalid 
in relation to defense policies due to security issues and considerations 
of general public safety. As such, scholars could usefully examine 
whether different conditions than those presented in this article guide 
interest groups’ inclusion in the framework.
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